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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(i) Did the District Court err in finding that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact regarding whether the "side trail" where the accident occurred was a road 
open to the public for off-road recreational use? 
(ii) Did the District Court err in finding that both the Off-Highway Vehicle 
Registration Act and the Limitation of Landowner Liability Act applied to immunize 
Defendant from liability for Plaintiffs injuries? 
Determinative Law: 
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-22-10.1(3). 
Utah Code Annotated, § 57-14-3. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 57-14-1. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). 
Schaerrer v. Stewaifs Plaza Pharm., Inc., 79 P.3d 922 (2003) 
Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338 (2000). 
Standard of Review: 
Factual disputes are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338, 341 (2000). When 
reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, the Appellate Court should give no deference 
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to the lower court's legal conclusions and should review the issues presented under a 
correctness standard. Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Phanru Inc., 79 P.3d 922, 928 (2003). 
Demonstration that Issues Were Preserved in the District Court: 
In the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment before Judge 
Lyman, counsel for Plaintiff argued that summary judgment was inappropriate and 
premature because there existed disputed issues of material fact. [Tr. 10, 11, 12, 27, 29, 
31] . During this same hearing, counsel for Defendant also acknowledged that there was 
"some dispute as to whether or not the property she was riding on was a trail or just the 
side of the road." [Tr. 6]. 
Counsel for Plaintiff also argued that the Off-Highway Vehicle Registration Act, 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-22-1 et seq., and the Utah Limitation of Landowner Liability 
Act, Utah Code Annotated § 57-14-1 et seq., did not apply to the injury at issue in this 
matter because the "side trail" where the accident occurred was not open to the public for 
off-road and/or recreational use. [Tr. 10, 11, 12, 27, 29, 31]. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-22-10.1: 
Vehicles operated on posted public land. 
(1) Currently registered off-highway vehicles may be operated on public land, 
trails, streets, or highways that are posted by sign or designated by map or 
description as open to off-highway vehicle use by the controlling federal, state, 
county, or municipal agency. 
(2) The controlling federal, state, county, or municipal agency may: 
(a) provide a map or description showing or describing land, trails, streets, or 
1
 References to the trial court record appear as [R. ]. References to the transcript of 
Summary Judgment Motions from the February 25, 2009, hearing before Judge Lyman 
appear as [Tr. ]. 
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highways open to off-highway vehicle use; or 
(b) post signs designating lands, trails, streets, or highways open to off-
highway vehicle use. 
(3) Liability may not be imposed on any federal, state, county, or municipality 
relating to the designation or maintenance of any land, trail, street, or highway 
open for off-highway vehicle use. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-14-1: 
Legislative purpose. 
The purpose of this act is to encourage public and private owners of land to 
make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes 
by limiting the owners' liability toward persons entering the land and water 
areas for those purposes. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-14-3: 
Owner owes no duty of care or duty to give warning—Exceptions. 
Except as provided in Subsections 57-14-6(1) and (2), an owner of land 
owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by any 
person entering or using the premises for any recreational purpose or to 
give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on 
those premises to that person. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c): 
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as 
to the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter involves an ATV accident that took place on or about August 7, 2006. 
[R. 1-5, 29-33, 67-81]. Appellant was riding a Polaris ATV along a portion of the Piute 
ATV trail that runs through, and around, Marysvale, Utah. [R. 1-5, 29-33, 67-81, 108-
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113], [Tr. 6]. As Appellant and her family rode their ATVs down the trail, they drove 
onto a well-worn side trail just off the main Paiute ATV trail. [R. 1-5, 29-33, 67-81], [Tr. 
6, 10]. Appellant was several feet ahead of her family when she ran into a barbed wire 
fence which had been erected across the side trail. [R. 1-5, 29-33, 67-81], [Tr. 6, 10-11]. 
Appellant was wearing a helmet; however, one of the strands of the barbed wire fence 
struck the exposed, unprotected portion of her neck below the helmet, causing severe 
lacerations to Appellant's neck, which required approximately 75 stitches. [R. 1-5, 29-33, 
67-81]. The side trail where the accident occurred is on property that is owned and 
controlled by the Town of Marysvale. [R. 1-5, 29-33, 67-81, 108-113], [Tr. 6]. Plaintiff 
alleges that the barbed wire across the side trail was placed in such a way that it was not 
visible to a member of the public using the trail. [R. 1-5, 29-33, 67-81]. The barbed wire 
severely injured the Appellant's neck. [R. 1-5, 29-33, 67-81], [Tr. 10-11]. 
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the Sixth Judicial 
District Court of Paiute County on or about August 2, 2007. [R. 1-5]. This action was 
initially assigned to Judge Mower in the Sixth Judicial District. [R. 1-5]. Plaintiff 
subsequently amended her Complaint on or about February 11, 2008. [R. 29-33]. On or 
about June 30, 2008, and after a short period of formal discovery, Defendant filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the Off-Highway Vehicle Act and the 
Limitation of Landowner Liability Act insulated Defendant from liability for Plaintiffs 
injury. [R. 40-41, 42-66]. Plaintiff filed an opposition on July 28, 2008, and the case 
was submitted for decision on August 17, 2008. [R. 67-81, 107]. The motion was heard 
on February 25, 2009, by Judge Lyman, a juvenile court judge in the Sixth Judicial 
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District Court for Paiute County. [R. 107 ]. Judge Lyman determined that there were no 
disputed material issues of fact, and that both the Off Highway Vehicle Registration Act 
and the Limitation of Landowner Liability Act applied to immunize Defendant from 
liability for Plaintiffs injuries. [R. 108-113, 114-115]. Judge Lyman's Memorandum 
Decision was entered on or about March 3, 2009, and his Order of Summary Judgment 
was entered on or about May 20, 2009. [R. 108-113, 114-115]. 
Plaintiff filed an appeal from Judge Lyman's Order of Summary Judgment on June 
3,2009. [R. 116-117]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. On or about August 7, 2006, Plaintiff (Amber Klein) was riding an ATV on the 
portion of the Piute ATV trail system that is located within the boundaries of Marysvale 
Town. [R. 1-5, 29-33, 67-81, 108-113], [Tr. 6]. 
2. As Plaintiff rode her ATV down the Piute ATV trail, she detoured off the trail 
onto a well-worn side trail that went around a cattle guard that was installed on the trail. 
[R. 1-5,29-33,67-81], [Tr. 6, 10]. 
3. The side trail that Plaintiff used was not part of the Piute ATV trail, was not 
intended for ATV use, and was in place for cattle and horse use only. [R. 25-26, 67-81, 
108-113], [Tr. 31]. 
4. The side trail that Plaintiff used was well-worn and appeared to have been 
well-traveled by ATVs or other motor vehicles. [R. 67-81], [Tr. 14-15]. 
5. The barbed wire fence that Plaintiff crashed into, as she traveled down the side 
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trail, appeared to be new; was very difficult to see; and was not marked with any signs or 
other visible markings. [R. 1-5, 29-33, 67-81], [Tr. 10]. 
6. The Mayor of Marysvale testified that the side trail where the accident 
occurred was owned by Marysvale, but was not part of the Paiute ATV trail, and was not 
open to the public for ATV or recreational uses, but was for livestock. [R. 25-26, 67-81, 
108-113], [Tr. 31]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal primarily asks the Court to determine whether Judge Lyman correctly 
held that there were no disputed issues of material fact that precluded him from ruling on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs contention is that the issue of 
whether the "side trail" where the accident occurred was open for off-highway 
recreational use is a material fact that was clearly disputed by the parties below. The 
record clearly demonstrates this factual dispute, as does the Memorandum Decision 
issued by Judge Lyman. At the very least, there were disputed facts sufficient to create a 
reasonable inference of dispute in favor of Plaintiff, the non-moving party. 
The fact of whether the side trail was open for off-highway recreational use is 
material because the Off-Highway Vehicle Registration Act and the Limitation of 
Landowner Liability Act only provide liability immunity if the property is "opened" to 
the public for off-highway vehicle or recreational uses. 
This appeal also asks the Court to determine whether Judge Lyman correctly 
applied the Off Highway Vehicle Registration Act and the Limitation of Landowner 
Liability Act to immunize Defendant from liability for Plaintiffs injuries. Plaintiffs 
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contention is that neither act applies because Gary James, Mayor of Marysvale Town, in 
his deposition, testified that the "side trail" where the accident occurred was not open to 
the public for off-highway ATV use, but was used solely for cattle and livestock uses. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE WERE CLEAR MATERIAL 
FACTUAL ISSUES IN DISPUTE. 
Summary judgment is only appropriate when the documentation on file and 
available to the Court shows that there is no disputed issue of material fact, such that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Surety Underwriters v. E & C 
Trucking, 10 P.3d 338, 341 (Utah 2000). In the context of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Court is to view the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 341. Therefore, if the facts and the 
reasonable inferences drawn from the facts show that there is a disputable issue of 
material fact, summary judgment is a premature and inappropriate remedy. 
Judge Lyman erred in granting summary judgment in this matter because there 
were clearly issues of disputed material fact contained in the record and raised by the 
parties. First, there was a factual dispute about whether the accident occurred on the 
Marysvale Town road system and/or Piute ATV trail system, or on a side-trail that is 
separate and apart from the Marysvale Town road system and/or Piute ATV trail system. 
Second, there was a dispute about whether the side trail was "opened" to the public for 
recreation purposes. As outlined below, these factual allegations were material to the 
resolution of this matter because the two statutes that Defendant relied upon in its motion 
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apply only to roads or trails that have been opened to the public for recreational use or 
opened as an ATV trail. See Utah Code Ann, § 57-14-1 et seq.] § 41-22-1 et seq. 
As demonstrated below, Judge Lyman, at the very least, erred by failing to draw 
"reasonable inferences" from the facts in favor of Plaintiff, the non-moving party. At the 
very least, this is grounds for a reversal of the Order of Summary Judgment. 
A. Disputed Material Fact for the Applicability of the Off-Road Highway 
Vehicle Registration Act: Was the Side Trail "Open" for Off-Highway 
Vehicle Use 
The Off Highway Vehicle Registration Act, contained in Utah Code Ann. § 41-22-
1 et seq., extends liability immunity to municipalities who open their property to off-
highway ATV use. Section 41 -22-10.1 (3) of the Off Highway Vehicle Registration Act 
provides that: 
Liability may not be imposed on any federal, state, county, or 
municipality relating to the designation or maintenance of any land, 
trail, street, highway open for off-highway vehicle use. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-22-10.1(3) (emphasis added). 
As stated in this statutory provision, governmental bodies are exempted from 
liability for accidents that occur on off-highway roads or trails if the trail has been 
"opened" for off-highway vehicle use. The necessary corollary of this statutory provision 
is that governmental bodies are liable to off-highway vehicle users who are injured on 
off-highway roads or trails that have not been "opened" for off-highway use. It is clear 
that the legislature would not need to statutorily remove a governmental body's liability 
and duties of care if such liabilities or duties did not exist in the first place. 
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The reasoning behind the language that the legislature used in this statutory 
provision, and the implications that naturally flow from this statutory language, is 
obvious—the legislature was interested in protecting those who operate off-highway 
motor vehicles. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-22-1 (noting that the purpose of the Off-
Highway Vehicles Act is to "promote safety and protection for persons . . . connected with 
the use, operation, and equipment of off-highway vehicles.") The legislature clearly 
acknowledged the risk presented to off-highway vehicle users, and established the Off-
Highway Vehicle Registration Act to protect, in part, users and operators of off-highway 
vehicles. It is also clear that the legislature acknowledged the fact that governmental 
bodies and actors have a common law tort duty to protect business invitees or known 
frequent trespassers3 that operate off-highway vehicles on trails, roads, and streets that are 
located on governmental land. Governmental bodies and actors have the option of 
exempting themselves from tort liability associated with property owners by designating 
and opening public roads, streets, and trails to off-highway vehicle use. 
In this case there was a dispute about whether the side trail where the accident 
occurred was part of the Paiute ATV trail, and whether the side trail was open to off-
highway recreational use. Defendants argued that the side trail was not a side trail, but 
Off-highway motor vehicles are defined, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-22-2, to 
include the type of all terrain vehicle that Plaintiff was operating and riding during the 
accident that is the subject of this matter. 
Utah law clearly recognizes that property owners have a duty to protect trespassers from 
dangerous conditions on their property when they have real or constructive knowledge 
that trespassers frequently intrude upon the property. See generally Connor v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 972 P.2d 414 (Utah 1998). 
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was actually part of the main Paiute ATV Trail, and open to off-highway recreational use 
[R. 42-66], [Tr. 14]. Plaintiff argued that the side trail was not part of the Paiute ATV 
trail, and was not open to off-highway recreational use. [R. 1-5, 29-33, 67-81], [Tr. 10, 
11, 12, 27, 29, 31]. Plaintiffs, in support of their position, pointed to the deposition of 
Gary James, Mayor of Marysvale Town; wherein Mayor James testified that the side trail 
where the accident occurred was not open or intended to be used for off-highway 
vehicles. [Tr. 31]. 
It appears from Judge Lyman's Memorandum Decision, that he recognized this 
factual dispute because Judge Lyman noted that ff[t]he side trails where the accident 
occurred was [sic] for cattle and horse access." [R. 108-113], It is not altogether clear, 
from Judge Lyman's decision, how he reconciles this factual dispute with his decision to 
grant summary judgment. It may be that Judge Lyman considered the dispute about 
where the accident occurred, and whether the accident site was open to for off-highway 
recreational use, to be immaterial. If this is the case, Judge Lyman erred. The single 
most material fact in determining whether the Off-Highway Vehicle Registration Act is 
applicable is whether the accident site—the "side trail"—was open for off-highway 
recreational use. This fact is material because it triggers the immunity offered by the Act. 
Judge Lyman also tried to avoid the material question of whether the "side trail" 
was open to the public for off-highway recreational use by entertaining conjecture about 
where the Paiute ATV trail began and ended. This conjecture among Judge Lyman and 
counsel took up a large portion of the oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. [Tr. 18-31], This conjecture also appears in Judge Lyman's Memorandum 
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Decision, where he determines that the expansive definition of "street" in the Off-
Highway Vehicle Act extends the "open" nature of the Paiute ATV Trail to the side trail 
where the accident occurred. [R. 108-113]. 
Judge Lyman's conjecture, and ultimate reliance on the Act's definition of 
"street," is unnecessary. In this matter, there is no question that the side trail where the 
accident occurred was not open for off-highway recreational use because Gary James, the 
Mayor of the Town of Marysvale, testified that the side trail was open only for cattle and 
horse use. [R. 67-81, 108-113], [Tr. 31]. According to the Off-Highway Vehicle 
Registration Act the determination of whether a piece of property is "open" is not to be 
determined by the interpretation of statute or by a Court—it is to be determined by the 
municipality or owner who owns the relevant property. Mayor James' pronouncement 
that the side trail was for cattle and horses is determinative: the side trail was not "open" 
and thus, the liability immunity provided by the Off Highway Vehicle Registration Act is 
inapplicable to this matter. Judge Lyman erred in ignoring this material fact and granting 
summary judgment. 
B. Disputed Material Fact for the Applicability of the Limitation of 
Landowner Liability Act: Was the Side Trail "Open" for Recreational 
Use? 
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act, contained in Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-
1 et seq., extends liability immunity to property owners, public and private, who open 
their property to the public for recreational use. The purpose of said Act is to provide a 
means by which public and private owners can limit their common law owner's tort 
liability by "opening" their land to the public for "recreational purposes." See Utah Code 
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Ann. § 57-14-1. A public or private landowner can "open" their land to the public for 
recreational purposes by "mak[ing] land and water available to the public" without charge 
or for a nominal fee. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-1, 57-14-4. The necessary corollary 
of this statutory provision is that property owners are liable to recreational users who are 
injured on recreational property that has not been "opened" for recreational use. It is 
clear that the legislature would not need to statutorily remove a property owner's liability 
and duties of care if such liabilities or duties did not exist in the first place. 
The legislature created this statutory provision to protect landowners who open 
their property up, without charge, to recreational users. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-1. 
The legislature also intended for the Act to provide a means for the public and private 
landowners to exempt themselves from common law tort liability in connection with 
users or invitees of their property. 
Again, as noted above, there was a dispute below about whether the side trail 
where the accident occurred had been opened for recreational use. This fact is material to 
the applicability of the Limitation of Landowner Liability Ac t—\f the property is not 
opened for recreational use, the property owner is subject to common law tort liabilities 
applicable to real property. 
In this case, it is alleged that the "well worn" and "well traveled" side trail where 
the accident occurred, was not open or intended to be used for recreational purposes. [R. 
1-5, 29-33, 67, 81], [Tr. 31]. As a result, Marysvale Town is not, under the Limitation of 
Landowner Liability Act, exempt from liability for Plaintiffs accident, and had a duty to 
protect Plaintiff from the dangerous condition that the barbed wire fence created on its 
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property. Judge Lyman erred in ignoring this material fact and granting summary 
judgment. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
OFF-HIGHWAY VEHICLE ACT AND THE LIMITATION OF 
LANDOWNER LIABILITY ACT IMMUNIZED MARYSVALE 
TOWN FROM LIABILITY FOR PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES 
As discussed above, Judge Lyman clearly erred in determining that the Off-
Highway Vehicle Act and the Limitation of Landowner Liability Act immunized 
Defendant from liability for Plaintiffs Injuries. These acts are only applicable if the side 
trail where the accident occurred was open for off-highway vehicle use or recreational 
use. Mayor James testified, in his deposition, that the side trail was for cattle and 
livestock use only. Judge Lyman erred in ignoring this material fact, and his 
determination to apply the Off-Highway Vehicle Registration Act and the Limitation of 
Landowner Liability Act was in error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court overturn 
the District Courf s decision granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
remand this matter to the District Court for additional proceedings. 
DATED this 7,fr* day of December, 2009. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
n^it— 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
Richard H. Reeve 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, Amber Klein 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
Exhibit A, Memorandum Decision 
Exhibit B. Order Of Summary Judgment 
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